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Data Mining CEO Compensation
Susan M. Adams Atul Gupta Dominique M. Haughton John D.Leeth
Bentley University

The need to pre-specify expected interactions between variables is an issue in multiple regression.
Theoretical and practical considerations make it impossible to pre-specify all possible interactions. The
functional form of the dependent variable on the predictors is unknown in many cases. Two ways are
described in which the data mining technique Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) can be
utilized: first, to obtain possible improvements in model specification, and second, to test for the
robustness of findings from a regression analysis. An empirical illustration is provided to show how
MARS can be used for both purposes.
Key words: data mining, interactions, modeling, multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS),
multiple regression
two ways in which the data mining technique
Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines
(MARS) can be utilized: first, to obtain possible
improvements in model specification, and
second, to test for the robustness of findings
from a regression analysis. An empirical
illustration of how MARS can be used for both
purposes is then provided.
The intuition underlying MARS is
straightforward; the algorithm examines the data
for all possible interactions among the specified
explanatory variables and for non-linear
relations between the dependent and explanatory
variables and, in general, yields substantial
improvements in explanatory power. Findings
from the MARS analysis can be used in two
possible ways. First, MARS may yield insight
into possible empirical relationships that exist in
data, but which have not been identified by the
researcher. Such relationships can be examined
for theoretical content and used to improve the
specification of the regression model.
A second useful application of MARS is
in the context of testing for the robustness of
findings from a particular regression. For
example, consider a research study interested in
examining the relationship between employee
gender
and
compensation.
Because
compensation is expected to depend on a variety
of characteristics, the typical regression model
includes a set of explanatory variables and a
dummy variable to capture the gender effect.

Introduction
The use of multiple regression analysis is
widespread in empirical research. To use
multiple regression analysis the full set of
independent variables affecting the dependent
variable must first be identified and all of the
expected interactions among these explanatory
variables specified. Since both theoretical and
practical considerations make it impossible to
pre-specify all possible interactions, the
explanatory power of any given regression
specification will be limited. In addition, while
theory may provide guidance as to which
predictors to use in a model, the functional form
of the dependent variable on the predictors is
unknown in many cases. This article describes
two ways in which the data mining technique
Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines
(MARS) can be utilized: first, to obtain possible
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on CEOs employed in the forty-one 4-digit SIC
industries with at least one female CEO.
Table 1 gives a summary of the
variables used in the analysis. The left-hand side
of the table provides information on the OLS
sample and the right-hand side provides
information on the MARS sample. To be
included in an OLS regression an observation
must have a complete set of information on all
explanatory variables. The MARS sample is
larger because the MARS procedure explicitly
controls for missing values, allowing all
observations with information on total
compensation to be included in the analysis, an
important advantage of MARS over OLS.
The dependent variable used was the
logarithm of the CEO’s total compensation for
the year, which includes salary, bonus, restricted
stock, stock options (evaluated using the BlackScholes procedure), long-term incentive
payouts, and other types of compensation. The
independent variables are fairly standard. Most
studies of wages and salaries include
information on human capital such as education,
general labor market experience, and experience
within a specific company (Topel, 1991; Willis,
1986). The ExecuComp data does not provide
information on education and measures of
experience are somewhat spotty. To capture
human capital characteristics included in the
analysis are age and the number of years the
person has served as CEO. (For some CEOs, the
data lists the date the person started working for
the company. Unfortunately, the information
was available for only 59.2 percent of the
sample and so was not used in the analysis.)
Because economic theory indicates that
investments in human capital should have
positive but diminishing returns, also included
were squares of age and years as CEO. While
early studies of the pay-performance relationship
found little evidence of such a link (see Jensen
& Murphy, 1990), some recent work documents
that CEO compensation is related to company
size and company performance (see Bebchuk &
Grinstein, 2005). Company size is measured
using the dollar value of sales revenue and
company performance using the return on assets.

The sign and statistical significance of the
dummy variable and the explanatory power of
the entire model depend on three factors: the
choice of explanatory variables, the set of
interactions included in the model, and the
specified functional form of the dependent
variable in terms of the predictors. While MARS
can add no insight into the choice of explanatory
variables, it can test for all possible interactions
among the explanatory variables, the
preponderance of which have not been included
in a normal regression analysis.
Moreover,
MARS
uses
splines
(understood here to be piecewise-linear
functions) to allow for possible non-linearities in
the data. Given that MARS will generally yield a
substantial improvement in explanatory power, a
finding that the sign and statistical significance
of a variable of interest (the dummy variable for
employee gender in our example) remains
unchanged serves as a useful test for the
robustness of the findings from the original
regression.
Normally,
researchers
using
regression analysis provide the results from
several model specifications to demonstrate the
empirical strength of their conclusions. MARS
provides a more structured approach to this
model specification procedure and, thereby,
generates a more powerful test of robustness.
Methodology
The Data
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) ExecuComp
database was used to examine the compensation
of male and female CEOs. This database tracks a
variety of corporate data for the 1500 largest
companies in the U.S. from 1992 to 2003 and
personal and compensation data for their
associated CEOs. From 1992 through 2003, 56
women served as CEOs of the top 1500
Standard & Poor’s companies in the United
States; in contrast, 4,242 men served as
corporate CEOs over the same time period. The
ExecuComp database yielded 214 individual
executive/year observations for female CEOs
and 18,179 observations for male CEOs. The
CEOs are scattered across 369 4-digit SIC
industries. To control for possible industry
effects in salary determination, analysis focused
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Total Compensation
(thousands of 2003 $)

Table 1: Means (Standard Deviations)
Difference in
MARS
OLS
OLS
Means
Sample
Sample
Sample
(absolute t/z
Men
Men
Women
statistic)
5,036
4,926
110
4,797
(17,332) (9,402)
(0.15)
(16,589)

Log Total
Compensation

7.69
(1.176)

7.73
(1.151)

-0.04
(0.43)

Age

53.96
(7.396)

51.14
(7.396)

Years as CEO

8.11
(7.957)

Sales
(billions of 2003 $)
Return on assets
(Percent)

4,768
(9,257)

Difference in
Means
(absolute t/z
statistic)
28
(0.04)

7.64
(1.170)

7.68
(1.157)

-0.04
(0.45)

2.82
(5.30)**

54.13
(7.937)

51.03
(7.327)

3.09
(5.96)**

7.97
(11.991)

0.14
(0.16)

8.06
(7.894)

7.93
(11.974)

0.13
(0.15)

2.93
(7.228)

2.70
(8.576)

0.23
(0.37)

2.85
(7.033)

2.63
(8.440)

0.22
(0.37)

0.10
(29.129)

1.68
(15.773)

-1.58
(1.31)

0.44
(28.033)

1.82
(15.564)

-1.38
(1.19)

Manufacturing

0.406

0.405

0.001
(0.03)

0.413

0.423

-0.010
(0.77)

Transportation

0.149

0.049

0.100
(3.98)**

0.152

0.047

0.105
(4.23)**

Trade

0.072

0.195

-0.123
(6.35)**

0.070

0.188

-0.117
(6.29)**

Finance

0.049

0.078

-0.029
(1.88)

0.051

0.075

-0.024
(1.56)

Services

0.324

0.273

0.051
(1.53)

0.314

0.268

0.047
(1.43)

Number

3,689

205

4,058

213

Variable

MARS
Sample
Women

been adjusted to correct for the impact of
inflation and are stated in 2003 dollars.
Table 1 uncovers only a few statistically
significant differences in means or proportions
between male and female CEOs. Within the
four-digit SIC industries examined, female
CEOs are a few years younger than their male
counterparts and the companies they operate are
more likely to be involved in trade and less
likely to be involved in transportation. In terms
of compensation, the data provide no evidence
that male and female CEOs are paid differently.

Finally, to control for differences in pay across
industries and over time the OLS analysis
includes binary variables measuring the
company’s 1-digit SIC code and a linear time
trend. The MARS analysis permits a more
detailed investigation of industry and time
effects. The MARS procedure includes a
categorical variable representing 41 different 4digit SIC industries and a categorical variable
representing 12 different years. All dollar figures
for total compensation and sales revenue have
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BF5 equals one if the SICNEW code for an
observation is one of those listed in the
expression (1, 2, 5, 13, …, etc.), zero otherwise.
This means that, of all the ways MARS
considered to create a dummy variable that
would represent a group of industries, the
grouping in BF5 is one of the groupings it found
would yield the best fit with the dependent
variable. Other industry groupings are identified
and expressed in other Basis Functions.
MARS looks for interactions among
independent variables, by introducing into the
model the product of two variables, if such an
interaction leads to a sufficient improvement in
the model. For example, the Basis Functions
BF23 and BF24 represent an interaction of age
with the number of years as CEO since BF21
includes BF18 in its expression, which in turns
includes age. An interesting aspect is that
MARS can (and often will) create interactions,
not between original variables, but between
restrictions of these variables to a particular
range as is done in BF23 and BF24. BF23
(respectively BF24) interacts age with number
of years as CEO, but only beyond 12 years as
CEO (respectively up to 12 years as CEO), and
in any case only up to ages of 43 years. BF23
and BF24 have a different coefficient in the final
model, so the strength of the interaction depends
on the range of years as CEO involved in the
interaction: it is stronger (.030) for BF24 than
for BF23 (.019).
To summarize, MARS ends up with a
collection of Basis Functions, which are
transformations of independent variables taking
into account non-linearities and interactions.
MARS then estimates a least-squares model
with a parsimonious set of Basis Functions as
independent variables. Parsimony is achieved by
removing Basis Functions, knots and
interactions which do not contribute sufficiently
to the model fit.
MARS, in essence, is an OLS
procedure, but with judicious transformations of
the independent variables. Risks of overfitting
are controlled in various ways by the algorithm
(Friedman, 1991, Section 3.6). To take into
account the fact the data are used not only to
estimate the coefficients of the Basis Functions
but to create these Basis Functions in the first

The MARS methodology
The MARS algorithm, proposed by
Friedman in 1991, relies on the following basic
ideas:
For each continuous independent
variable, MARS creates a piecewise linear
function with too many change points (knots) to
begin with, and then prunes unnecessary knots
by a backward procedure. Consider the functions
BF3 and BF4 (Basis Functions 3 and 4)
identified by MARS (definitions of all Basis
Functions are given in Appendix A). These two
functions are preceded by BF1, as follows:
BF1 = (SALES > .);
BF3 = max(0, SALES – 1.747087) * BF1;
BF4 = max(0, 1.747087 - SALES ) * BF1;
BF1 is zero whenever the variable SALES is
missing, and one otherwise. The functions BF3
and BF 4, taken together, define a piecewise
linear function of SALES, with a break point
(otherwise referred to as a knot or a change
point) at about 1.75 billion dollars. Note that
BF3 is zero when SALES is less than 1.747, and
BF4 is zero when SALES is greater than 1.747.
Basis functions are chosen by MARS to achieve
the best fit in a regression of the dependent
variable on the Basis Functions. Of course,
without any restriction on over-fitting, better and
better fits will be attained by using more and
more Basis Functions breaking at more and
more knots. MARS uses a backward stepwise
method to eliminate Basis Functions and knots
which contribute least to the fit of the model.
For each independent categorical
variable, MARS groups categories and creates
dummy variables which correspond to these
groups in such a way as to yield the best fit
possible. For instance, the Basis Function BF5,
given by the expression is:
BF5 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 2 OR
SICNEW = 5 OR SICNEW = 13 OR SICNEW
= 15 OR SICNEW = 16 OR SICNEW = 21 OR
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 23 OR SICNEW
= 25 OR SICNEW = 26 OR SICNEW = 27 OR
SICNEW = 28 OR SICNEW = 29 OR SICNEW
= 31 OR SICNEW = 32) * BF1;
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forecasting recessions; the author finds that for
the time series considered for predicting
recessions, MARS yields a better in-sample, but
a worse out-of-sample performance than for
instance probit regression (with a dependent
variable of 1 if a time period was in recession, 0
if not); this may indicate that the MARS models
used in this context were over-fitting the data to
some extent. This is the reason why it is
recommended in the literature (Deichman, et. al.
2002; Munoz & Felicisimo 2004) to evaluate
MARS on validation samples, independent of
the sample used to build the data, in order to
select a MARS model that will not over-fit the
data and will predict well on validation samples.
This approach is adopted in Deichman,
et al. (2002) where MARS is used in the context
of direct response modeling; the authors find
that response models which use MARS Basis
Functions perform better than alternatives on
independent validation samples. Munoz &
Felicisimo contrast a MARS methodology with
several alternatives and reach two interesting
conclusions: one is that MARS yields the best
predictive power, and the other is that an
independent validation sample is truly needed
(cross-validation is not sufficient).
The issue of over-fitting is considered
later in this article and will explain why in our
case over-fitting does not risk calling results into
question. Finally, an article where MARS is
used in analyses of living standards in Vietnam
(see for example Deichman, et. al. (2001)),
where interesting interactions are revealed
between regions of the country and other
predictors when modeling the logarithm of
household expenditure per capita, indicating that
such models of household wealth are likely to
differ across regions, with the importance of
some predictors varying across these regions.

place, a penalized sum of squared residuals is
minimized to select the final model (in least
squares regression, a non-penalized sum of
squares would be used). This is achieved by
minimizing a quantity referred to as the
Generalized Cross Validation (GCV) criterion
equal to (1/N) SSR/[1-C(M)/N]2 (see Friedman,
1991, p. 20), where N is the number of
observations, SSR is the residual sum of squares,
and C(M) is a measure of the complexity of a
model with M Basis Functions. The complexity
C(M), which would equal M in usual least
squares modeling, is defined to be equal to M +
dM, where d is a penalty for each additional
Basis Function.
The parameter D can be determined in a
number of ways: a value of 3 has been
recommended on the basis of simulations in
Friedman (1991), but a larger value may be
appropriate for larger sample sizes. An
alternative, used in this article, is to determine
the parameter d via ten-fold cross validation (not
to be confused with the GCV mentioned above,
the GCV does not actually involve crossvalidation). Ten-fold cross- validation involves
randomly dividing the data into ten parts,
building the model – with various values of the
parameter d – with nine tenths of the data, and
evaluating the performance of the model on the
remaining tenth. This is done ten times, for each
tenth in turns, and the performance averaged out
over the ten runs. The value of d yielding the
best performance is selected, and the GCV
criterion is computed with this value of d. A
clearly over-fitting model is first built, and Basis
Functions are removed one after the other,
yielding a sequence of models with a decreasing
number of Basis Functions. A model is selected
from that sequence which minimizes the GCV
criterion.
A convenient place to get information
with introductions to the MARS methodology,
white papers, and useful references is the
Salford Systems Web site (www.salfordsystems.com). The article by De Veaux, et al.
(1993) includes a good introduction to MARS,
albeit in the context of chemical engineering,
and contrasts the MARS methodology with that
of neural networks. The article by Sephton
(2001) gives an introduction to MARS and
evaluates how well MARS performs at

Results
Table 2 presents the OLS results. As is typical,
several specifications to check for robustness are
included. The first specification includes only
human capital characteristics, while the second
augments these characteristics with information
on the company. The third specification controls
for differences in pay by industry and over time
and the fourth specification interacts each
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percent for the OLS model. This improvement is
due (in part) to the fact that MARS identifies
groups of industries for which the compensation
model differs, a matter very much at the heart of
compensation modeling, and successfully
includes interactions of these industry groupings
and other independent variables.
Most important to our analysis, gender
does not enter the model at all once the above
mentioned interactions are included. Even
following a very structured approach for
determining model specification, an approach
which investigates hundreds of possible
interactions among the independent variables
and allows for complex non-linear relationships
to exist between the dependent and independent
variables, the data still uncovers no difference in
how male and female CEOs are compensated. A
maximum of 80 basis functions were allowed to
be used in this MARS model, and ten-fold crossvalidation were used to evaluate models
considered by MARS. The maximum number of
basis functions allowed (80) is sufficient for
MARS to build a large enough model from
which to prune to get a satisfactory final model
(such a maximum should be at least as large as
about twice the number of basis functions in the
final model; in this case the final model contains
33 basis functions, so an initial maximum of 80
basis functions is ample). To determine how
much to prune (in other words how many basis
functions to drop) to yield a final model, MARS
uses as a measure of performance a modified Rsquare measure referred to as the Generalized
Cross Validation (GCV) criterion; the GCV
incorporates a cost per basis function into its
formula; the higher the cost, the smaller the
number of basis functions in the final model.
The choice of that cost is quite crucial, and is
performed here by ten-fold cross validation,
which consists in splitting the data into ten parts,
using 9/10 of the data to build the model and the
remaining tenth to evaluate candidate models
corresponding to different choices of cost in
order to select the cost that yields the best
performance on the held out tenth of the data.
Typically, and here as well, each tenth of the
data plays the role of a hold-out sample in turns
and performance is judged on all ten such
samples. The absence of a gender effect in CEO

independent variable with the binary variable
indicating the gender of the CEO. The last
specification is a test to determine if any
significant differences exist in how male and
female CEOs are paid across the variables
considered. In standard parlance, it is a test to
determine if it is permissible to pool male and
female CEOs in the same sample.
The results in Table 2 appear
remarkably robust. In none of the first three
specifications is the female binary variable
statistically significant, indicating no difference
in pay between male and female CEOs.
Although in the fourth specification the Fstatistic indicates male and female CEOs are
paid differently, the only statistically significant
difference in CEO pay is in the transportation
industry, but the positive interaction term points
to female CEOs earning more than their male
counterparts. In short, in terms of pay the data
provide no evidence of discrimination against
women once they have made it to the highest
rung of the corporate ladder. Almost all other
studies of gender differences in compensation
find women earning far less than men,
controlling for other factors including
occupation and title (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001).
The other variables in Table 2 are also
robust across the four empirical specifications in
terms of statistical significance and absolute
size. In all four specifications general experience
as measured by age raises log total
compensation but at a decreasing rate (the
coefficient on age is significantly positive and
the coefficient on age squared is significantly
negative). Company size as measured by sales
and company performance as measured by
return on assets significantly boost CEO
compensation. The positive coefficient on time
demonstrates a substantial yearly increase in real
CEO compensation and the negative coefficients
on transportation and trade shows CEOs in these
industries earn less, all else equal, than CEOs in
manufacturing (the excluded category). The
other variables are insignificant across all four
specifications.
Appendix A presents the full set of
MARS results. The MARS model explains
about 46 percent of the variability in (logged)
total compensation, compared to about 17
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Table 2: OLS Results on Log Total Compensation ($2003)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Constant
3.118
4.442
3.806
(2.31)*
(3.33)**
(2.91)**
Female
0.041
0.035
-0.060
(0.24)
(0.22)
(0.35)
Age
0.166
0.117
0.133
(3.29)**
(2.38)*
(2.71)**
Age squared
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
(3.10)**
(2.36)*
(2.63)**
Years CEO
-0.011
-0.004
-0.011
(0.96)
(0.33)
(1.03)
Years CEO squared
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.77)
(0.45)
(0.89)
Sales (billions 2003$)
0.049
0.049
(5.94)**
(5.76)**
Return on assets
0.003
0.004
(2.80)**
(3.30)**
Time
0.048
(6.13)**
Transportation
-0.669
(7.92)**
Trade
-0.289
(2.24)*
Finance
-0.030
(0.19)
Service
-0.070
(0.84)
Age×Female
Age squared×Female
Years CEO×Female
Years CEO squared×Female
Sales×Female
Return on assets×Female
Time×Female
Transportation×Female
Trade×Female
Finance×Female
Service×Female
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(4)
3.773
(2.79)**
2.193
(0.36)
0.134
(2.65)**
-0.001
(2.55)*
-0.015
(1.31)
-0.000
(1.05)
0.049
(5.35)**
0.004
(3.30)**
0.050
(6.24)**
-0.694
(8.12)**
-0.330
(2.37)*
0.007
(0.04)
-0.083
(0.98)
-0.86
(0.36)
0.001
(0.30)
0.104
(1.95)
-0.002
(1.90)
-0.002
(0.13)
-0.005
(0.96)
-0.034
(0.80)
0.967
(2.72)**
0.504
(1.31)
-0.586
(1.23)
0.264
(0.69)

DATA MINING CEO COMPENSATION
Table 2: OLS Results on Log Total Compensation ($2003) (continued)
(1)
(2)
(3)
R-squared
F-statistic: all coefficients = 0

(4)

0.02

0.12

0.17

0.18

3.04**

8.59**

14.44**

10.50**

F-statistic: female and female interaction terms = 0
2.93**
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Note: The t statistics are calculated using standard errors that
correct for heteroskedasticity and the correlation among observations for the same individual. Industry
results are measured relative to the excluded category, manufacturing.
appearance of Table 3 indicates, at least in terms
of CEO compensation, that industry effects are
far more complex than a simple upward or
downward shift in compensation. Multiple
industry interactions exist among the
independent variables and the interactions are
not grouped according to 1-digit or 2-digit SIC
industry.
Table 4 presents the impact of each of
the independent variables by industry. The
notation with a plus sign (+) as a superscript
indicates the expression in brackets is evaluated
only for observations where the expression is
positive. The expression is set equal to zero for
all other observations. Blanks in the table
indicate that the coefficient of the expression in
the 1st column is zero for that particular industry
group. For example, Panel A demonstrates that,
as estimated in the MARS model, in SIC1 a one
percentage point increase in a company’s return
on assets (ROA) raises total CEO compensation
by 1.4 percent (0.014 log points) when ROA is
below 7.047 percent but by 3.6 percent (0.035
log points) when ROA is above 7.047 percent.
(In a log-linear specification a one-unit change

compensation is robust across empirical
specifications.
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the MARS
results. To simplify matters, the two tables
present results only for observations in the data
set where none of the independent variables are
missing. When one or more independent
variables is missing, the model adjusts for that in
the equations (see for example BF1 in Appendix
A, which captures the fact that the variable
SALES is not missing), but the adjustments
involve a fairly small number of observations
(see Table 1).
An examination of the basis functions in
Appendix A reveals that, for observations
without missing values, MARS identifies
fourteen groups of Standard Industry Codes
(SIC) among which it determines that the
models for (log of) total compensation differ.
Table 3 categorizes each of the 41 4-digit SIC
industries by MARS-created SIC group. The
first column of the table lists the industry’s 1digit SIC code, the second column provides a
description of the 4-digit SIC industry, and the
final columns of the table identify which of the
14 broadly related MARS industries each 4-digit
SIC industry belongs. The effects of the various
industry variables on total compensation depend
on these industry groups; as seen in Appendix A
that a 4-digit industry can appear in multiple
MARS groupings since different industry
groupings
can
interact
with
different
independent variables.
Generally, researchers investigating
industry effects classify firms based on the
firm’s 1-digit or 2-digit SIC code. The OLS
analysis in Table 2 allows CEO compensation to
shift upward or downward depending on the
firm’s 1-digit SIC industry. The Swiss-cheese

ˆ

in an independent variable causes a e β − 1
percentage change in the dependent variable,
where βˆ is the estimated parameter. For small
values, β is approximately equal to the
percentage change.) In the second SIC group a
one percentage point increase in ROA has no
impact on log total CEO compensation when
ROA is below 1.206 percent but, surprisingly,
reduces total CEO compensation by 8.0 percent
(0.077 log points) when ROA is above 1.206
percent. MARS uncovers no significant impact
on CEO compensation from higher ROAs in the
other 12 industry groups. The OLS regressions
presented in Table 2 model pay for performance
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observations in the sample. Only 249 of the
sample observations are for CEOs younger than
43 with less than 12 years of CEO experience
(6.4 percent) and only 340 observations are for
CEOs with less than 1.63 years CEO experience
in industry group SIC3 (8.7 percent).
The positive impact of CEO experience
on compensation pertains to many more
observations: 926 observations in SIC2 have
more than 0.583 years of CEO experience and
are older than 43 (23.8 percent) and 30
observations are for CEOs younger than 43 with
more than 12 years CEO experience (0.8%). For
the remaining 2,163 observations (55.5 percent)
MARS finds no impact on compensation from
greater CEO experience. In other words, the
MARS results indicate for the vast majority of
CEOs greater CEO experience has either a
positive or a neutral impact on compensation
although for a few CEOs in some industries and
at some levels of general and CEO-specific
experience greater years heading the company
reduces compensation.
Panel D shows the impact on CEO
compensation from increases in company size as
measured by sales revenue. As can be seen, the
impact of company size depends on the
company’s current level of sales, the age of the
CEO, and the industry. Ignoring the age effect,
an increase in sales has a larger impact when a
company is small, sales less than $1.7471 billion
(70.9 percent of the sample), than when it is
large, sales greater than $1.7471.
Age augments the impact of sales on
CEO compensation for CEOs older than 43 in
companies with less than $8.1352 billion in sales
revenue and for CEOs younger than 43 in
companies with less than $4.4857 billion in sales
revenue. Evaluated at the mean age of 53.8, a $1
billion dollar increase in sales revenue raises
CEO compensation in most industry groups by
75.5 percent for companies with sales of less
than $1.7471 billion, by 6.3 percent for
companies with sales between $1.7471 billion
and $8.1352 billion, and by 1.82 percent for
companies with sales greater than $8.1352
billion. Mathematically, company size appears
to raise CEO compensation but at a decreasing
rate.

as a general phenomenon across industries. The
MARS methodology, in contrast, discovers
ROA affecting CEO pay in only a few 4-digit
SIC industries, meaning that pay for
performance is far more limited than one might
have originally thought.
The second panel in Table 4 reveals that
in all industry groups except for SIC5 and to
some extent SIC3, CEO compensation rose over
time. The coefficient on year is generally zero
from 1992 to 1997 but positive for years 1998 to
2003. The parameter of 0.206 on the years 1998
to 2003 indicates that, all else equal, CEOs
earned about 23 percent more in these years than
in the years from 1992 to 1997 in industry
groups other than SIC3, SIC4, and SIC5. The
largest jump in salaries over time occurs in SIC4
where the impact of year moves from a -0.439
log points for years 1992 to 1997 to a +0.206 log
points for years 1998 to 2003. Other studies also
find a rise in CEO salaries in the 1990s
(Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005). The MARS
results indicate not a general upward trend in
CEO compensation in the 1990s, as implied by
the OLS results in Table 2, but a structural break
in compensation occurring in 1998.
As can be seen in Panel C, the impact of
an additional year of CEO experience
(YRSCEO) depends on the age of the CEO, a
rough proxy for general labor market
experience, and the overall level of CEO
experience. For CEOs younger than 43 an
additional year of CEO experience lowers total
compensation for individuals serving as CEO for
less than 12 years but raises it for individuals
serving as CEO for more than 12 years. For
CEOs older than 43 an additional year of CEO
experience has no impact on total compensation
except in SIC2 where the impact of greater CEO
experience is positive and SIC3 where the
impact of greater CEO experience is negative for
individuals serving as CEO for less than 1.63
years.
The MARS results on CEO experience
are in contrast to the OLS results in Table 2.
OLS finds no impact of CEO experience on total
compensation, while MARS discovers additional
CEO experience raising compensation in some
cases but lowering it in others. The
counterintuitive results of CEO experience
reducing compensation apply to very few
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Table 3. MARS identified industry groups
1-digit SIC
Industry

4-digit SIC Industry

Mfg

Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton

Mfg

Apparel & Other Finished Prods
of Fabrics & Similar Mat’l

Mfg

Men's & Boys' Furnishings, Work
Clothing, & Allied Garments

Mfg

Newspapers: Publishing or
Publishing & Printing

Mfg

Commercial Printing

Mfg

Pharmaceutical Preparations

Mfg

Biological Products, (No
Diagnostic Substances)

Mfg

Perfumes, Cosmetics & Other
Toilet Preparations

Mfg

Pottery & Related Products

Mfg

Special Industry Machinery, NEC

Mfg

Computer & Office Equipment

Mfg

Computer Peripheral Equipment,
NEC

Mfg

Electric Housewares & Fans

Mfg

Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus

Mfg

Motor Vehicle Parts &
Accessories

Mfg

Motor Homes

Mfg

Electromedical &
Electrotherapeutic Apparatus

Mfg

Dolls & Stuffed Toys

Mfg

Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Industries

Trans, Comm
& Utilities

Communications Services, NEC

Trans, Comm
& Utilities

Electric Services

Trans, Comm
& Utilities

Natural Gas Distribution

Trade

Retail-Apparel & Accessory
Stores

Trade

Retail-Women's Clothing Stores

Trade

Retail-Furniture Stores

Trade

Retail-Drug Stores & Proprietary
Stores

Trade

Retail-Jewelry Stores

Trade

Retail-Catalog & Mail-Order
Houses

Finance, Ins,
Real Estate

Savings Institution, Federally
Chartered

Finance, Ins,
Real Estate

Patent Owners & Lessors

Services

Services-Personal Services

Services

Services-Help Supply Services

Services

Services-Computer Programming,
Data Processing, etc.

Services

Services-Prepackaged Software

Services

Services-Computer Integrated
Systems Design

Services

Services-Telephone Interconnect
Systems

Services

Services-Business Services, NEC

Services

Services-Medical Laboratories

Services

Services-Child Day Care Services

Services

Services-Research, Accounting,
Engineering, Management

Services

Services-Commercial Physical &
Biological Research

SIC1
BF5

SIC2
BF25

SIC3
BF6

SIC4
BF13
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SIC5
BF61

SIC6
BF73

SIC7
BF45

SIC8
BF43

SIC9
BF11

SIC10
BF7

SIC11
BF57

SIC12
BF19

SIC13
BF51

SIC14
BF75
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Table 4: MARS Results on Log Total Compensation
Panel A: Return on Assets (ROA)

(ROA−7.047)+
(7.047−ROA)+
(ROA−1.206)+

SIC1
BF5
0.035

SIC2
BF25

SIC3
BF6

SIC4
BF13

SIC5
BF61

SIC3
BF6
0.206

SIC4
BF13
0.206
-0.439

SIC5
BF61
0.206
0.225

SIC6
BF73

SIC7
BF45

SIC8
BF43

SIC9
BF11

SIC10
BF7

SIC11
BF57

SIC12
BF19

SIC13
BF51

SIC14
BF75

SIC8
BF43
0.206

SIC9
BF11
0.206

SIC10
BF7
0.206

SIC11
BF57
0.206

SIC12
BF19
0.206

SIC13
BF51
0.206

SIC14
BF75
0.206

-0.014
-0.077

Panel B: Year

Yrs 98-03
Yrs 92-97
Yrs 92,93,95,98,03

SIC1
BF5
0.206

SIC2
BF25
0.206

SIC6
BF73
0.051

SIC7
BF45
0.206

-0.228

Panel C: CEO Tenure (YRSCEO)
SIC1
BF5
(YRSCEO−.583)+
(1.63−YRSCEO)+
(YRSCEO−12.0)+x
(43−AGE)+
(12−YRSCEO)+x
(43−AGE) +

SIC2
BF25
0.018

SIC3
BF6

SIC4
BF13

SIC5
BF61

SIC6
BF73

SIC7
BF45

SIC8
BF43

SIC9
BF11

SIC10
BF7

SIC11
BF57

SIC12
BF19

SIC13
BF51

SIC14
BF75

0.350
0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

SIC1
BF5
0.018

SIC2
BF25
0.018

SIC3
BF6
0.018

SIC4
BF13
0.018

SIC5
BF61
0.018

SIC6
BF73
0.018

SIC7
BF45
0.018

SIC8
BF43
0.018

SIC9
BF11
-0.019

SIC10
BF7
0.018

SIC11
BF57
0.018

SIC12
BF19
0.018

SIC13
BF51
0.018

SIC14
BF75
0.077

-0.519

-0.519
-3.000

-0.519

-0.519

-0.519

-0.519

-0.519

-0.821

-0.519

-0.519

-0.519

-0.519

-0.519

-0.519

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

SIC1
BF5
0.035

SIC2
BF25
0.035

SIC3
BF6
0.035

SIC4
BF13
0.035

SIC5
BF61
0.035

SIC6
BF73
0.035

SIC7
BF45
0.017

SIC8
BF43
0.035

SIC9
BF11
0.035

SIC10
BF7
0.035

SIC11
BF57
0.035

SIC12
BF19
-0.016

SIC14
BF75
0.035

-0.052

-0.052

-0.052

-0.052

-0.052

-0.052

-0.052

-0.052

-0.052

-0.052

-0.052

-0.052

SIC13
BF51
0.035
0.201
-0.052

-0.052

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

-0.004

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.059

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.019

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

0.030

Panel D: Sales Revenue (SALES), in billions 2003 $

(SALES−1.7471)+
(1.7471−SALES)+
(0.2881−SALES)+
(8.1352−SALES)+
x(AGE−43)+
(4.4857−SALES)+
x(43−AGE)+

Panel E: Age of the CEO (AGE)

(AGE−43)+
(43−AGE) +
(AGE−54) +
(AGE−43)+x
(8.1352−SALES)+
+

(43-AGE) x
(4.4857-SALES)+
(43−AGE)+x
(YRSCEO−12)+
(43−AGE)+x
(12−YRSCEO)+

Note: Table 3 lists the specific 4-digit SIC industries comprising each SIC industry grouping. A superscript on a
bracketed term indicates the expression is evaluated only for observations where the expression is positive. The
expression equals zero for all other observations. Blanks in the table indicate the associated industry effect is zero.
The table presents results only for observations with information on all independent variables. Appendix A
presents the full set of MARS results including the impact of missing values.
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earnings and to allow for the possibility of
earnings hitting a peak at some point. Based on
the OLS results, CEO compensation hits a peak
somewhere between 54.9 and 57.2 years of age
depending on the empirical specification.
Although the MARS results do not reproduce
the standard leveling off of earnings, they do
indicate an earnings peak at age 54, a result
largely consistent with the OLS analysis.

The OLS results in Table 2 examine the
impact of sales revenue on CEO compensation
but the impact of sales is assumed to be linear.
The MARS results suggest that a more
appropriate specification would include sales
revenue and sales revenue squared to allow for
the positive but diminishing returns from
company size. (When both sales revenue and
sales revenue squared are included in the OLS
regression both coefficients are highly
statistically significant (p values < 0.001) but the
inclusion alters the size and significance of the
other coefficients only slightly.) In Table 2
across all specifications, an additional $1 billion
of sales revenue creates a 5.0 percent increase in
CEO compensation. In Table 3, an additional $1
billion of sales revenue creates in most
industries a 6.3 percent increase in CEO
compensation when evaluated at the sample
means of age and sales revenue ($2.914 billion).
The final panel of Table 4 reports the
impact of age on CEO compensation. The last
four rows of the Panel E simply duplicate the
interactive results on age and sales and age and
years as CEO discussed previously. Across all
age groups higher sales revenue either expands
the positive impact of age on total compensation
or contracts the negative impact – the interaction
between age and sales is positive. Surprisingly,
for CEOs younger than 43 an additional year of
general experience as measured by age reduces
total compensation, all else equal. The reduction
is smaller as years as CEO expands for CEOs
serving for fewer than 12 years but is larger as
years as CEO expands for CEOs serving more
than 12 years. In all but SIC13 an additional
year of general experience raises total
compensation by 1.42 percent for CEOs from 43
to 54 but reduces total compensation by 7.56
percent for CEOs older than 54 when evaluated
at the mean level of sales. The influence of age
on total compensation is not impacted by years
as CEO for CEOs older than 43.
The stereotypical age/earnings profile
has a worker’s earnings rising steeply early in
his or her career, leveling off over time, and then
declining. Researchers include age and age
squared as independent variables in an OLS
analysis of earnings to capture the positive but
diminishing impact of general experience on

Conclusion
In most empirical investigations theory guides
the selection of independent variables but rarely
dictates the functional relationship between the
dependent and the independent variables or
specifies all possible interactions among the
independent
variables.
Consequently,
researchers generally present several sets of
results generated using slightly different
estimating relationships to demonstrate that the
conclusions of the analysis are robust to model
specification. Multivariate Adaptive Regression
Splines (MARS) is a data mining technique that
examines data for all possible interactions
among specified explanatory variables and for
non-linear relations between the dependent and
explanatory variables. By using MARS
researchers can check for the robustness of their
empirical findings in a highly structured manner,
thereby providing a more convincing case that
the results are insensitive to model specification.
Additionally, MARS may uncover relationships
that can be examined for theoretical content and
aid future research in the area.
As an example of how MARS can be
used as a procedure to check for robustness and
as an aid in future research, we examine data on
CEO compensation to determine if pay
differences exist between men and women. Most
studies find men out earn women by a sizable
margin even after controlling for differences in
education, experience, and occupation (Altonji
& Blank, 1999; Bertrand & Hallock, 2001;
Stanley & Jarrell, 1998). Using standard OLS
analysis we find no evidence male CEOs have
an advantage over female CEOs in terms of
compensation. Across the four empirical
specifications we examine female CEOs earn the
same or more than male CEOs, all else equal. In
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modeled as a general phenomenon across
industries. The MARS analysis finds return on
assets raising CEO compensation but in only one
broad industry grouping – meaning pay for
performance is fairly limited. The OLS analysis
uncovers a positive, linear relationship between
sales revenue and CEO compensation. The
MARS results suggest sales revenue has a
positive but diminishing impact on CEO
compensation. In the OLS analysis, the number
of years a person has served as CEO appears to
have no impact on compensation, while MARS
finds CEO experience raising total compensation
but only in a few industry groupings. Finally,
OLS indicates a CEO’s age, a proxy for general
labor
market
experience,
raises
total
compensation but at a decreasing rate, a result in
line with the human capital model and the
stereotypical age/earnings profile. MARS finds a
far
more
complex
relationship
with
compensation falling, rising, and then falling
again as the CEO ages. Both the OLS and the
MARS results imply CEO compensation peaks
at around 54 years of age.
It is not suggested that MARS be used
as a replacement to the standard procedures of
model building and hypothesis testing. Instead,
MARS may be viewed as a complement to the
more traditional methods of analysis. There are
implications for practicing managers to consider
when evaluating the use of MARS and OLS. For
the manager who wants to understand the
dynamics of executive compensation, the MARS
model provides more details about the specifics
related his or her particular situation (e.g., the
industry grouping formed by MARS and
corresponding interactions). By examining data
for unanticipated and possibly complex
interactions among the independent variables
and for potential nonlinear relationships between
the dependent and independent variables, MARS
allows researchers to conduct a structured test of
robustness and determine important areas for
future research. In particular, the MARS
analysis of CEO compensation suggests
additional work is required to determine the
factors causing the compensation explosion in
1998, the reasons for the paucity of pay for
performance, and the elements generating
common
compensation
practices
across
industries.

the MARS methodology the variable
representing gender never enters the model
indicating that no significant pay difference
exists between male and female CEOs. The
MARS model controls for observable
characteristics and considers all possible
interactions
among
the
observable
characteristics and total compensation in
addition to potential nonlinearities in the
relationships
between
the
observable
characteristics and total compensation. In short,
the absence of a gender effect on CEO
compensation is robust.
In terms of the other factors affecting
CEO compensation, OLS generates a fairly
standard picture of CEO compensation. All else
equal, CEOs leading larger companies as
measured by sales revenue, more profitable
companies as measured by return on assets, and
who have more general labor market experience
as measured by age earn more than CEOs
leading smaller companies, less profitable
companies, and who have less general labor
market
experience.
Over
time
CEO
compensation has expanded by almost 5 percent
per year in real terms and CEOs in
transportation and trade earn less than CEOs in
manufacturing. Inconsistent with the human
capital model of earnings, OLS finds no reward
for CEO experience.
The MARS results are generally
consistent with the OLS results but with some
important distinctions. Similar to OLS, MARS
finds sizable differences in CEO compensation
across industries. Unlike OLS, the MARS
grouping of industries is unrelated to a broader
industry classification such as a 1- or 2-digit SIC
code. Further, the MARS industry effects do not
simply increase or decrease compensation but
instead interact with the other independent
variables, suggesting the underlying model of
compensation varies by industry groupings.
However, note that these industry groupings are
not the recognized industry groups based on 1or 2-digit SIC codes. Similar to OLS, MARS
shows CEO compensation rising over time, but
unlike OLS the rise is not gradual. In most of the
MARS industry groups a structural break in
compensation occurs in 1998 causing CEO pay
to jump by about 23 percent. In the OLS
analysis, the impact of return on assets is
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SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 24 OR
SICNEW = 33 OR SICNEW = 35 OR
SICNEW = 37 OR SICNEW = 38) *
BF10;
BF15 = (AGE > .) * BF1;
BF16 = (AGE = .) * BF1;
BF17 = max(0, AGE - 43.000) * BF15;
BF18 = max(0, 43.000 - AGE ) * BF15;
BF19 = (SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 9 OR
SICNEW = 14 OR SICNEW = 20 OR
SICNEW = 32 OR SICNEW = 33 OR
SICNEW = 34 OR SICNEW = 37 OR
SICNEW = 40) * BF17;
BF21 = (YRSCEO > .) * BF18;
BF23 = max(0, YRSCEO - 11.997) * BF21;
BF24 = max(0, 11.997 - YRSCEO ) * BF21;
BF25 = (SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 7 OR
SICNEW = 8 OR SICNEW = 9 OR
SICNEW = 13 OR SICNEW = 28 OR
SICNEW = 30 OR SICNEW = 32 OR
SICNEW = 34 OR SICNEW = 36 OR
SICNEW = 37 OR SICNEW = 38);
BF27 = (SALES > .) * BF25;
BF30 = max(0, 0.288101 - SALES ) * BF27;
BF32 = max(0, 8.135196 - SALES ) * BF17;
BF33 = (YEAR = 1992 OR YEAR = 1993 OR
YEAR = 1995 OR YEAR = 1998 OR
YEAR = 2003) * BF6;
BF35 = (ROA > .) * BF5;
BF37 = max(0, ROA - 7.047) * BF35;
BF38 = max(0, 7.047 - ROA ) * BF35;
BF39 = (YRSCEO > .) * BF25;
BF40 = (YRSCEO = .) * BF25;
BF41 = max(0, YRSCEO - 0.583) * BF39;
BF43 = (SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 6 OR
SICNEW = 9 OR SICNEW = 10 OR
SICNEW = 12 OR SICNEW = 13 OR
SICNEW = 14 OR SICNEW = 15 OR
SICNEW = 16 OR SICNEW = 17 OR
SICNEW = 18 OR SICNEW = 19 OR
SICNEW = 20 OR SICNEW = 21 OR
SICNEW = 30 OR SICNEW = 31 OR
SICNEW = 33 OR SICNEW = 34 OR
SICNEW = 35 OR SICNEW = 37 OR
SICNEW = 38 OR SICNEW = 40 OR
SICNEW = 41) * BF4;
BF45 = (SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 4 OR
SICNEW = 6 OR SICNEW = 7 OR
SICNEW = 8 OR SICNEW = 9 OR
SICNEW = 10 OR SICNEW = 11 OR
SICNEW = 12 OR SICNEW = 18 OR

Appendix A: The MARS model; basis functions
and estimated equation
Basis Functions
BF1 = (SALES > .);
BF3 = max(0, SALES – 1.747087) * BF1;
BF4 = max(0, 1.747087 - SALES ) * BF1;
BF5 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 2 OR
SICNEW = 5 OR SICNEW = 13 OR
SICNEW = 15 OR SICNEW = 16 OR
SICNEW = 21 OR SICNEW = 22 OR
SICNEW = 23 OR SICNEW = 25 OR
SICNEW = 26 OR SICNEW = 27 OR
SICNEW = 28 OR SICNEW = 29 OR
SICNEW = 31 OR SICNEW = 32) * BF1;
BF6 = (SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 4 OR
SICNEW = 6 OR SICNEW = 7 OR
SICNEW = 8 OR SICNEW = 9 OR
SICNEW = 10 OR SICNEW = 11 OR
SICNEW = 12 OR SICNEW = 14 OR
SICNEW = 17 OR SICNEW = 18 OR
SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 20 OR
SICNEW = 24 OR SICNEW = 30 OR
SICNEW = 33 OR SICNEW = 34 OR
SICNEW = 35 OR SICNEW = 36 OR
SICNEW = 37 OR SICNEW = 38 OR
SICNEW = 39 OR SICNEW = 40 OR
SICNEW = 41) * BF1;
BF7 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 3 OR
SICNEW = 4 OR SICNEW = 10 OR
SICNEW = 11 OR SICNEW = 12 OR
SICNEW = 13 OR SICNEW = 16 OR
SICNEW = 20 OR SICNEW = 21 OR
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 24 OR
SICNEW = 25 OR SICNEW = 28 OR
SICNEW = 35 OR SICNEW = 38 OR
SICNEW = 39 OR SICNEW = 41);
BF9 = (YEAR = 1998 OR YEAR = 1999 OR
YEAR = 2000 OR YEAR = 2001 OR
YEAR = 2002 OR YEAR = 2003) * BF1;
BF10 = (YEAR = 1992 OR YEAR = 1993 OR
YEAR = 1994 OR YEAR = 1995 OR
YEAR = 1996 OR YEAR = 1997) * BF1;
BF11 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 3 OR
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 25 OR
SICNEW = 27 OR SICNEW = 28 OR
SICNEW = 34) * BF3;
BF13 = (SICNEW = 4 OR SICNEW = 6 OR
SICNEW = 7 OR SICNEW = 8 OR
SICNEW = 11 OR SICNEW = 13 OR
SICNEW = 17 OR SICNEW = 21 OR
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SICNEW = 32 OR SICNEW = 35 OR
SICNEW = 37) * BF64;
BF75 = (SICNEW = 2 OR SICNEW = 4 OR
SICNEW = 5 OR SICNEW = 7 OR
SICNEW = 16 OR SICNEW = 18 OR
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 23 OR
SICNEW = 29 OR SICNEW = 30 OR
SICNEW = 31 OR SICNEW = 32 OR
SICNEW = 34 OR SICNEW = 38 OR
SICNEW = 40 OR SICNEW = 41) * BF3;
BF77 = (YRSCEO > .) * BF6;
BF80 = max(0, 1.626 - YRSCEO ) * BF77;

SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 23 OR
SICNEW = 24 OR SICNEW = 35 OR
SICNEW = 37 OR SICNEW = 38 OR
SICNEW = 39) * BF17;
BF47 = (AGE > .) * BF39;
BF49 = max(0, AGE - 54.000) * BF47;
BF51 = (SICNEW = 4 OR SICNEW = 6 OR
SICNEW = 7 OR SICNEW = 14 OR
SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 21 OR
SICNEW = 23 OR SICNEW = 37) *
BF21;
BF53 = (ROA > .) * BF40;
BF55 = max(0, ROA - 1.206) * BF53;
BF57 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 2 OR
SICNEW = 3 OR SICNEW = 5 OR
SICNEW = 7 OR SICNEW = 8 OR
SICNEW = 15 OR SICNEW = 17 OR
SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 22 OR
SICNEW = 23 OR SICNEW = 24 OR
SICNEW = 26 OR SICNEW = 28 OR
SICNEW = 29 OR SICNEW = 31 OR
SICNEW = 37 OR SICNEW = 38 OR
SICNEW = 39 OR SICNEW = 41) * BF1;
BF59 = (SICNEW = 12 OR SICNEW = 19 OR
SICNEW = 24 OR SICNEW = 26 OR
SICNEW = 30 OR SICNEW = 34) *
BF16; BF61 = (SICNEW = 3 OR
SICNEW = 7 OR SICNEW = 12 OR
SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 20 OR
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 23 OR
SICNEW = 25 OR SICNEW = 28 OR
SICNEW = 32 OR SICNEW = 35) *
BF10;
BF63 = (YRSCEO = .) * BF9;
BF64 = (YRSCEO > .) * BF9;
BF66 = max(0, 4.485668 - SALES ) * BF21;
BF67 = (SICNEW = 2 OR SICNEW = 5 OR
SICNEW = 6 OR SICNEW = 7 OR
SICNEW = 14 OR SICNEW = 16 OR
SICNEW = 21 OR SICNEW = 31 OR
SICNEW = 34 OR SICNEW = 40) *
BF63;
BF73 = (SICNEW = 1 OR SICNEW = 3 OR
SICNEW = 4 OR SICNEW = 5 OR
SICNEW = 9 OR SICNEW = 11 OR
SICNEW = 12 OR SICNEW = 13 OR
SICNEW = 17 OR SICNEW = 18 OR
SICNEW = 19 OR SICNEW = 20 OR
SICNEW = 22 OR SICNEW = 24 OR
SICNEW = 27 OR SICNEW = 31 OR

Estimated Equation
Y = 6.661 + 2.206 * BF1 + 0.0177346 * BF3 0.518625 * BF4 - 1.014 * BF5 - 0.399 *
BF7 + 0.206 * BF9 - 0.203566 * BF11 0.439 * BF13 + 0.035 * BF17 - 0.051 *
BF19 - 0.595 * BF21 + 0.019 * BF23 +
0.030 * BF24 + 0.408 * BF25 – 3.000 *
BF30 - 0.00353013 * BF32 - 0.228 *
BF33 + 0.035 * BF37 - 0.014 * BF38 +
0.018 * BF41 - 0.301961 * BF43 - 0.018 *
BF45 - 0.052 * BF49 + 0.201 * BF51 0.077 * BF55 - 0.158 * BF57 - 0.869 *
BF59 + 0.225 * BF61 + 0.0589534 *
BF66 - 0.762 * BF67 - 0.155 * BF73 +
0.0590723 * BF75 + 0.350 * BF80;
Appendix B: Variables
AGE = age of the CEO.
NEWSIC = 4-digit SIC industry. NEWSIC is a
categorical variable ranging from 1
(Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton)
to
41
(Services-Commercial
Physical & Biological Research).
See Table 3 for a complete listing of
the 4-digit SIC industries.
ROA = return on assets.
SALES = sales revenue in billions of 2003 $.
Y = log of total compensation.
YEAR = observation year.
YRSCEO = years serving as CEO.
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